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The first Covid-19 infection case was registered in Brazil during the Carnival causing a new sanitary 
problem and deepening other economic, political and moral problems already existing in our society. 
The way Covid-19 arrived in Brazil is very illustrative of our social inequalities. The first cases were 
registered in rich neighborhoods as some of their residents returned from their holidays in Europe. But it 
has quickly spread to the poorest and most vulnerable population. The first death in Rio de Janeiro was 
of a maid that worked for a rich couple that got infected in Europe. The Pandemic evolved from the rich 
zones and from the big cities to their peripheries and smaller cities, affecting zones with deficient medical 
services.  
The size and the diversity of Brazil require a central coordination to organize the sub-national efforts and 
to manage the distribution of the scarce medical resources among different regions. The central 
government response, besides denying the importance and the extent of the Pandemic, was rather 
insufficient: the federal government often boycotted sub-national governments’ initiatives by discrediting 
local governments and by adopting contradictory policies. Consequently, there wasn’t a unified strategy 
that would have benefited all regions of the country both in sanitary and economic terms.  
More than this, misinformation has been a central element in the central government diversionist 
strategy. The confusion of directives, diagnostics and even of official numbers have reduced the public 
trust and compliance to the measures adopted by the local governments and encouraged the premature 
adoption of deconfinement measures. This purposely “confusing” strategy is present also in the external 
policy, creating unnecessary hostility towards important trade partners (notably, China) and institutions 
(WHO). This misinformation flows through official channels but also by the diffusion of Fake news and 
the adoption by the president and his relatives of a polarizing and authoritarian hate speech.  
Still on the sanitary front, it’s worth saying that the central government spent around 10% of the amount 
initially announced for the combat of the Covid-19 Pandemic and, also, didn’t play a coordination role in 
a possible industrial reconversion, which could have increased the national supply of medical inputs and 
equipments. A good illustration of the Federal Government´s lack of commitment to strategies 
adequately designed to cope with the Covid-19 Pandemics, is that the after two health Ministers resigned 
for disagreeing with the president´s policies the position has been filled by an army general, as an interim 
ministry, since mid-May.  
Despite government has repeatedly denied the severity of the pandemic in Brazil, the numbers show 
that Brazil may reach the first place in world´s ranking of Covid-19 deaths and cases. By June 12th, 
Brazil showed the world's second-highest numbers of Covid-19 deaths and cases - the number of deaths 
surpassed 41,000 and the number of cases, 820,000. But the country is already the number one in both 
new daily cases and deaths, what evidences that the pandemic is far from being controlled in Brazil2. 
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2 Data from Financial Times (https://www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f8-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441). 
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Moreover, the statistics in Brazil are certainly underestimated as the consequence of limited testing3 and 
of possible mistaken deaths notifications.  
In economic terms, the sanitary crisis struck an, already, weak economy, after three years of low 
economic growth, facing a high unemployment rate and a growing (and high) informality in the labor 
market. The adoption by the federal government of economic measures in order to mitigate the impacts 
of the crises was slow and insufficient4. Both the measures concerning the enterprises and the workers 
didn’t avoid the growth of the unemployment rate to 12,6% in April.  
In fact, the employment survey for Brazil (PNAD, IBGE) shows a huge reduction of both occupation (-
5,2%), total wages (-3,3%) and economic active population (-3,8%) in the last trimester (February to April 
2020) related to the precedent trimester (Nov-Dec 2019/ January 2020). Moreover, 10 million formal 
workers – around 30% of total formal employment – were admitted on the wage reduction or job 
suspension program till the beginning of June5. 
The negative impact of unemployment on income and poverty can be worsened by the fact that informal 
jobs, that usually are an alternative for formal employment retraction in Brazil, are at the present limited 
due to the confinement and economic recession. An important measure adopted by the Government 
was the concession of a three-month compensation for informal and self-employment workers 
corresponding to 2/3 of the minimum wage. Again, the protracted negotiation in Congress, both, the slow 
pace and the operational problems for the implementation of such income transfers, showed the 
inefficiency and lack of commitment of the government in adopting adequate measures to mitigate the 
Corona-crisis. From my point of view, the action (or lack of) from the federal government is a 
consequence of a myopic vision of the pandemic and its impact on the economy, reflecting its fiscal 
obsession which is revealed in its official discourse emphasizing the (wrong) opposition between health 
and economics. Additionally, government insists on the short-term character of the measures adopted 
during April and May and, for fiscal reasons, resists to consider the extension of them for a longer period, 
what should be included within the scope of a medium-term recovery plan.  
The perspectives for the Brazilian economy are very pessimistic, with a long and strong recession in 
view. Inequalities tend to deepen as the job losses are expected mainly in the low-wage sectors and 
additional compensation measures are not foreseen.  
Brazilian GDP may fall by 11% and 14 million occupations may disappear in 2020, according to the most 
pessimist (but quite realistic) estimation of the impact of Covid-19 on Brazilian economy (Dweck et al, 
2020)6. In terms of employment, more than 70% of the occupations’ losses come from the low wage 
sectors characterized by low social protection – such as some services (notably, wholesale and retail 
                                               
 
3 In April 20th (last available data for Brazil), the number of tests by new confirmed case was of 2.27 in Brazil while this 
number was over 20 in Argentina and over 300 in Korea (Site Our World in Data, see 
https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-testing). 
4 Brazilian measures (both revenue, expenditure and financial ones, till April 2020) corresponds to 10% of its GDP, 
according to IMF (2020). The spent of Brazil is lower than those of Advanced countries – notably Germany, Italy, Japan and 
UK, but exceeds the most of other developing and emerging economies. For now, the measures are expected to last about 
three months, which might compromise the (probably difficult) recovery of Brazilian economy. 
5 See https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2020/06/10/10-milhoes-de-trabalhadores-formais-ja-tiveram-reducao-de-
salario-ou-contrato-suspenso.ghtml. For a more detailed analysis on the impact of Covid-19 on Brazilian labor market, see 
Augusto Junior, F. (2020). 
6 An intermediate scenario predicts a decrease of 6,4% of the Brazilian GDP for 2020. The annual rate growth will probably 
be between these two scenarios. Our predictions are in line with those from other national and international institutions, 
such as CEPAL (2020), which predicts a GDP reduction of 5,2% and World Bank (2020) which predicts a retraction of 8%. 
   
 
  4 
 
trade and other services7) and Construction. These workers are already facing difficulties in recovering 
their income – both in formal and informal sectors – but they are also more likely to be affected by the 
medium and long terms effects of technological changes and digital transformation. In terms of 
Production, Manufacturing responds for 40% of the national total gross production’s decrease. Even 
after decades of losing relative importance in terms of Brazil´s aggregate product, Manufacturing still 
remains an important sector for the economy operation because of its economic linkages. The productive 
specialization among manufacturing activities may also change (partially caused by the evolution of 
exports), with a reduction of more sophisticated activities, such as machine and equipment and transport 
equipment production. This deepening of a “regressive specialization” will impose dynamic restrictions 
to long term economic growth and development.  
To worsen this scenario, the president has been betting on the strategy of radicalization adopting an 
authoritarian discourse towards and stimulating the political polarization in order to appease his 
supporters. This strategy is a response to his loss of popularity and inability to negotiate with the Justice, 
part of the Congress and Governors. His popularity has been diminishing since mid-2019, a trend that 
was reinforced by the way he is dealing with the Coronavirus crisis. 
At the University, this dual, economic and medical, crisis has been felt very strongly. On one hand, public 
universities have been working hard in the daily combat of the coronavirus by developing and producing 
medicines, virus tests, medical equipment and other essential supplies and by giving medical and 
psychological assistance to the general population. On the other hand, budget constraints – a heritage 
from a draconian budget law voted two years ago and worsened by the current government fiscal 
obsession – make more difficult this complex effort. Concerning our main activity in university – teaching 
and teaching related activities – it’s partially paralyzed because of material limitations faced by a 
considerable part of the students to adequately access remote education. Once again, up to the writing 
of this note there is no initiative from the Education ministry that would allow disadvantage students to 
overcome their accessibility problems. The only positive point we can see from this terrible scenario is 
that, despite recent demoralizing campaign against science, public universities and research centers 
since Bolsonaro became president, the fight against the Pandemic gave to our institutions more visibility, 
reinforcing the position as ally to the population during the health crisis. The same recognition seems to 
benefit the Brazilian public health system, which was affected negatively by years of low investment.  
Briefly, the short and medium-term prospects for Brazil are awful in sanitary, socio-economic and political 
terms, all these dimensions reinforcing themselves and worsening the broad social impacts of the crisis. 
In fact, the country is seriously ill as inequalities and poverty are deepening and its democracy is under 
attack. 
  
                                               
 
7 In this sector, domestic services and food are the most affected activities. 
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